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The paper compares private returns to education of men and women
for fourteen E.U. countries. Building on de la Fuente (2003), I deﬁne the
rate of return as the discount rate equalizing marginal costs and beneﬁts
of education. I extend his model by estimating separately the values of
the relevant parameters for men and women and introducing variables
speciﬁcally related to maternity leaves and beneﬁts. The main result is
that, given the proﬁles of earning of a man and a woman studying the
average numbers of years in each country and working full-time up the end
of their active lifes, women’s rates of return are higher for most countries.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the economic literature, human capital accumulation has been identiﬁed as
one of the most relevant engines of economic growth. In the social sciences
literature, human capital accumulation and (ﬁrst of all) the level of formal edu-
cation have often been seen as one of the most important factors aﬀecting many
dimensions of social life, including structure and dynamics of the family and
fertility patterns. For instance, the existence of a negative correlation between
education and fertility is often claimed.
Recent work by de la Fuente (2003) provides an important reference point to
address these issues in economically advanced countries. The report, written on
behalf of the European Commission, provides a comparative analysis of private
and social returns on education in 14 European countries. The main ﬁndings
are:
- educational attainment is an important determinant of individual earnings
and aggregate productivity;
- human capital is an attractive investment from both the microeconomic and
the macroeconomic point of view. At the individual level de la Fuente deﬁnes the
"private premium" on education taking as reference point a balanced portfolio
of corporate shares and government bonds. Comparing the estimated social
returns on human capital with the return on physical capital, he derives the
"social premium". I report the values of private and social premia on schooling
estimated for selected E.U. countries:






Average of 14 countries 5,72 2,49
With respect to the policy implications, in all countries (but Sweden), the
private premium is signiﬁcantly larger than the social one, suggesting that an
increase in general subsidies is not required.
Starting from these results, several papers have developed the analysis fo-
cusing on individual countries, see de la Croix and Vanderberghe (2004) for
Belgium, Ciccone (2004) for Italy and de la Fuente and Domenech (2003) for
Spain.
All these papers provide gender-free estimates. Gender is relevant to this
issue in many dimensions:
1. estimates of the Mincerian equations are typically diﬀerent for men and
women;
2. actual rates of participation in the labor force vary dramatically across
genders, presumably aﬀecting the social returns on education;
23. the typical working experience varies across genders, also because of the
diﬀerent experiences of maternal/paternal leaves.
The main purpose of this paper is to start addressing some of these issues.
My focus will be exclusively on private returns on education and, consequently,
I will ignore the second issue mentioned above. Moreover, I will take as given
the diﬀerences in the parameters of the Mincerian equations and I will focus
exclusively on issues related to maternity.
The main purpose of the paper is to compare the returns on education of
men and women entering the job market at the end of their formal education
and exiting the job market at the average age of retirement. Their life-time
experience will diﬀer for several reasons:
1. wage proﬁles of men and women are diﬀerent;
2. gender-speciﬁc rates of unemployment are diﬀerent;
3. the length of the active life is diﬀerent for men and women;
4. unemployment beneﬁts are (more properly, can be) diﬀerent, due (mostly)
to wage diﬀerences;
5. public policies related to maternity leaves aﬀect in diﬀerent ways men and
women.
The procedure adopted to compute the gender-speciﬁc rates of return on
education is identical to the one adopted in de la Fuente (2003) for the case
of males. For the case of women, the basic model is modiﬁed to take into
consideration that the actual female working experience is aﬀected by maternity
episodes and, consequently, by maternity leaves and maternity related monetary
beneﬁts. Therefore, maternity causes several diﬀerences in working life across
genders. Potentially, it also has some consequences related to the female speciﬁc
rates of return. This is because of the correlation that may exist between
education and fertility. The (negative) relationship between these two variables
is often taken for granted. While there are many studies on this issue (and
corroborating this claim) referred to developing countries, there seems to be
very little empirical evidence on this issue in economically advanced countries.
It suﬃces to say that, in the literature on this issue, most of the references are
to Jones (1982) and, somewhat improperly, to U.N. (1995, a study just referred
to developing countries). In this paper, to evaluate the relation education -
fertility, I will exploit some more recent evidence based on the U.N.C.E. "Family
and Fertility Studies" referred to several European countries. These reports
provide (on a comparable basis) information on actual and expected fertility
rates, broken down by education levels and, therefore, they provide one of the
ingredients for the estimates. It turns out that, indeed, there exists a negative
correlation between education and fertility. The quantitative eﬀect on the return
to education is however quantitatively fairly small (but of the same order of
3magnitude of the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the rates of unemployment by levels of
education).
Public policies have an important role in determining the eﬀect of fertility
on rates of returns. These policies diﬀer a lot across countries, even within
the E.U.. There is an unavoidable degree of arbitrariness in imputing beneﬁts
to a given typology of workers. In the Appendix, I precisely spell out the cri-
teria adopted in selecting and attributing beneﬁts. Generally speaking, the
convention adopted may lead to overestimate women private returns on edu-
cation. Therefore, my estimates provide a sort of upper bound on the set of
"reasonable" estimates .
The set up of the paper is the following: The next section presents the
model adopted by de la Fuente (2003). Essentially, I adopt his formalization
for men. The section also presents and motivates the model I adopt to estimate
the returns for women. The third section presents the deﬁnition of the main
variables and the main results. These are discussed in section four. Technical
details on the derivations of the fundamental formulas are in Appendix A. Most
details on the computations are in Appendix B.
2 Description of the model
2.1 Private returns on education for men
The approach I will follow in computing the rates of return on education is the
one proposed by de la Fuente (2003). In fact, my estimates of the male returns
are based exactly on his model. In the estimates for women, the same basic
approach will be modiﬁed to take into account maternity leaves and beneﬁts.
Let’s ﬁrst consider the basic model. Consider an individual who studies for
S years and retires at time U.L e t S0 be the average number of years spent in
school.
Earning of a full-time worker with S year of schooling are given by the prod-
uct of an increasing function f(S) of education and of an exogenous "technical
eﬃciency index", At ≡ A0egt. Following de la Fuente, I assume that after-tax
earnings of a full-time employed individual are given by [f(S)−T(f(S)]At, i.e.,
that "tax rates are a function of relative rather than absolute incomes" (page
16).
If unemployed, individuals obtain net beneﬁts that may or may not be related
to their previous earnings and to average earnings, a[f(S)−T(f(s))]+b[f(S0)−
T(f(S0))].
Let p(S) be the probability of being employed for an agent with S years of
schooling, an increasing function of S. Then, the discounted life-time earnings






(1 − p(t))[a(f(t) − T(f (t))) + b(f(S0) − T(f(S0))]
¾
Ate−rtdt
Schooling implies direct private costs, denoted by CM(S) (estimated, per year,
4as a ﬁxed fraction µs of the average earnings of a production worker with S0






Finally, I assume that, while in school, individuals devote a ﬁxed fraction φ of
their time to studying and school attendance. Therefore, their labor supply is
given by a fraction (1−φ) of the labor supply of full-time workers. Moreover, I
assume that students are not entitled to unemployment beneﬁts and that their
probability of being employed is a ﬁxed fraction, η, of the probability of a full-
time worker. Hence, the present value of the expected life-time earning while




ηp(t)[(1− φ)f(t) − T ((1 − φ)f(t))]Ate−rtdt
T h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h ee x p e c t e dn e t lifetime earnings for men is then
VM(S)=IM(S)+ JM(S) − CM(S)
Observe that, as in de la Fuente (2003), I ignore retirement beneﬁts (for a
justiﬁcation, see his page 17).
Id e ﬁne as private rate of return on education the value of r such that
the average level of education S0 is the optimal solution to the problem of
maximizing VM(S) for the representative (male) agent.
Hence, r is obtained as the value such that
∂VM(S)
∂S |S0 =0 .
Let’s deﬁne



















where θ is the Mincerian return to schooling parameter,   measures the curva-
ture of the function p(S) at S0, normalized by p(S0),τ 0 and T0 are the average
and the marginal rates of income tax for a full-time worker with education S0,
while τs is the average tax rate on the income of a student with education S0
working part-time.
Finally, let R ≡ (r − g) and H ≡ (U − S0).
Using this notation and by a straightforward manipulation of
∂VM(S)
∂S |S0 =0 ,
one obtains equation (9) in de la Fuente (2003, p.17),
(1)
RM

























5I will use (1) to evaluate the private rates of return on education for males.
As made precise in the following section and in Appendix B, I will use values
of the parameters referred to the male population to compute RM.T h e m a i n
departure from de la Fuente (2003) is that he considers a single male with
earnings equal to the ones of an Average Production Worker (in the sequel,
APW). I consider a couple with two children where the male has earnings
equal to 100%APW, while the woman has earning equal to 67%APW. Evidently,
marginal and average tax rates (τ0 and T 0), as well as unemployment beneﬁts,
need to be changed accordingly.
2.2 Private returns on education for women
For female individuals, I modify the basic function V (S) as follows. Direct
private education costs and earnings while in school are determined as above.
However, given that female average earnings are estimated at 67%APW, the
parameter deﬁning direct private costs of education as a fraction of the female










ηp(t)[(1− φ)f(t) − T(((1 − φ)f(t))]Ate−rtdt.
The key diﬀerence is in the deﬁnition of the expected life-time earning after
school. I explicitly introduce in the function IW(S) maternity and parental
leaves and child-beneﬁts as follows: let q(S) be the fraction of the (full-time)
working life (of length H) when the representative woman does not have ma-
ternal leaves. Evidently, (1−q(S)) will depend upon the number of children, c,
and upon the length of (paid or unpaid) maternity leaves allowed by law, d.






During a fraction q(S) of her active life, a female member of the labor-force
will be employed with probability p(S), unemployed with probability (1−p(S)).
For this fraction of her active life, expected earnings are deﬁned exactly as above.
During a fraction (1 − q(S)) of her active life, a female member of the labor-
force can, legally, be on maternal leave. Evidently, during this period, she
can be either employed (with probability p(S)) or unemployed. If employed,
I assume that a woman will actually take a leave of the maximum allowed
length. In this period, she will receive a fraction γ of her previous earning,
plus other beneﬁts related to child-caring and typically independent of personal
income and depending instead on average income. This second component will
be denoted as δ [f(S0) − T((f(S0))]. If unemployed, obviously, she will not
take a maternal leave. Her income will be given by the usual unemployment
beneﬁts, a[f(S) − T(f(s))] + b[f(S0) − T(f(S0))], plus the maternity related




{q (t)[p(t)(f (t) − T (f (t))) +
+(1− p(t))(a(f (t) − T (f (t))) + b(f (S0) − T (f (S0))))] +
+(1− q(t))[p(t)(γ (f (t) − T (f (t))) + δ(f (S0) − T (f (S0))) +
+(1− p(t))(a(f (t) − T (f (t))) + b(f (S0) − T (f (S0))) +
+δ (f (S0) − T (f (S0))))]}Ate−rtdt
As above, the rate of return on education is the value of r such that S0 is
the optimal solution to the problem maximize VW(S).
Using the notation introduced above, setting q0 = q(S0),ξ=
∂q(S)
∂S |S0
q0 ,a n d
k0 = p0 (q0 +( 1− q0)γ)+( 1− p0)(a + b)+( 1− q0)δ,
from
∂VW(S)
∂S |S0 =0 , I obtain (see Appendix A)
(2)
RW
































Clearly, when q(S)=1 ,e q u a t i o n(2) reduces to (1).
Equations (1) and (2) may be given a very similar interpretation: In both
eqs., denominators can be seen as the sum of marginal opportunity and direct
costs of education (expressed as a share of the instantaneous after-tax earnings
at S0, (f(S0) − T(f(S0)))).
Similarly, numerators give the marginal eﬀect of education on earnings, once
again expressed as a fraction of the after-tax instantaneous earnings at S0. In (1),
this eﬀect can be decomposed into two components: one related to the Mincerian
parameter θ and a second one related to the eﬀect of S on the probability of
employment. In the case of women, there is a third component, due to the
eﬀect of education on fertility, captured by the parameter ξ. The "weight" of
ξ can be interpreted as the marginal increase of income (as a share of after-
tax expected earnings) due to the change of the fertility rate induced by an
increase in the level of education. The "weight" of   measures the marginal
(percentage) eﬀect of the increase in education on income due to the change in
the probability of employment. Similarly, the "weight" of θ measures the eﬀect
on after-tax incomes due to the eﬀects that an increase in education has on the
earning function f(S).
As we will see later, the maternity-related policy parameters (γ and δ)a r e
quite diﬀerent across countries. Therefore, it is natural to ask what is the eﬀect
of their changes on female rates of returns. Increases in the values of γ and δ
have a direct eﬀect on the rate of return R because they decrease the opportunity
7cost of maternity. There are also indirect eﬀects, because changes in γ and δ
aﬀect the fertility rate and may inﬂuence the values of q(S0) and p(S0). Here,
I will just consider the (presumably larger) direct eﬀects. The indirect eﬀects
depend, among other parameters, on the second derivatives of q(S) and p(S).
Unfortunately, the available data do not allow for any sensible conjecture on
their values.
To compute the eﬀects of changes in (γ, δ)o nR W,rewrite (2) as F(RW) −



















Bear in mind that the two derivatives measure the rates of change of RW due
to changes in γ and δ, under the assumption that the optimal level of schooling
is invariant, because, by construction, in this model, the optimal value of S
is given (and equal to the country average level) while the rate of discount is
treated as an endogenous variable.









































Both derivatives have an undeﬁned sign. For the second one, if q0 is positive
(or negative but suﬃciently small) the sign is negative, as one would expect,
because increases in δ increase the opportunity cost of schooling and, since S0
is given (individuals can not change the level of education chosen), the rate of
return decreases in order to guaranty that S0 persists as the optimal choice for
the individuals. In the sequel, while discussing the estimates, we will see that,
for the sample of countries considered here, the estimated values of ∂Rw
∂δ are,
indeed, always negative.
It turns out that the ﬁrst derivative is always negative, too. This is somewhat
counterintuitive, because one would expect a positive value for it, given that an
increase in the value of γ increases the expected future income. However, the
opportunity costs of schooling also increases. The impact of a change in γ on
the opportunity costs dominates all the others. Numerically, in most of the
countries, the values of q0 and of   are fairly small. This is also possibly due to
the postulated time independence of the variables.
The numerical values of the elasticities of RW with respect to γ and δ,
Eγ and Eδ, are reported in section 4.
83 Data and main results
In this section, I present my estimates, by gender, of the private returns on edu-
cation. Their are computed using equations (1) and (2) above. For each country,
I consider a representative married couple with two children. de la Fuente (2003)
considers, instead, a single individual with wage equal to 100%APW. It follows
that our estimates are not directly comparable. I don’t refer to single parents
because, in most of the countries considered, most women are married at the
time of child-bearing. I assume that male earnings are equal to 100% of APW,
while female ones are 67% of APW. This is a fairly realistic assumption, if we
take into consideration the actual average earnings in manufacturing for women
and men in the European countries (ILO (1995)).
As in de la Fuente, I assume that, after schooling, agents are in the labour
force until the average age of retirement. Moreover, I also assume that they
want to work 20% of a standard work-year while enrolled in school.
The computations also consider taxes on labour income and unemployment
beneﬁts. In particular, for women, I include child cash beneﬁts from general
government (while I don’t include tax expenditures, i.e., tax allowances and tax
credits) and beneﬁts related to maternity and childcare provided to working
women.
In the sequel, when convenient, I will use subscript W and M to denote the
values of the parameters for women and men, respectively.
Table 1 describes the parameters and variables used. The details of the
construction of the variables are in Appendix B.
Table 1: Parameters and variables
For the empirical estimation of the eﬀects of education on earning, I use the
Mincerian returns. As show in the ﬁgure below (and in Table 8), the values of
θW are, in general, equal or larger than the ones of θM. The average value
of θW is 8,09%, of θM is 7,23%. The only countries where θW is signiﬁcantly
lower than θM are Denmark and The Netherlands. To the contrary, relevant
(and positive) diﬀerences are observed in Ireland (+4,7%), Greece (+2,3%), UK
(+2,1%) and Germany (+1,9%).
Figure 1: Mincerian coeﬃcients for 14 European countries, by gender
Average ages of retirement (UM and UW) and lengths of the expected work-
ing life, H, do not vary a lot across genders. In average, HM is 2 years longer
than HW , except for Finland where U (59 year of age) and H (40 years of
work) are the same for men and women, (for the computations, see Appendix
B).
Figure 2: Length of the working life, by gender
One of the motivations for the study of private returns by gender is given by
the large diﬀerences in the gender speciﬁc rates of unemployment. Indeed, in
9all the countries, female rates of unemployment are larger. The only exception
i sU . K . . I fw el o o ka tt h em e a nv a l u e ,t h ed i ﬀerence is about 3%. In Spain
and Greece, the diﬀerences increase, respectively, to 10,2% and 7,6%. In other
countries (Belgium, Italy and France), they are around 4-5%.
Figure 3: Total rates of unemployment, by gender
The negative (positive) relationship between unemployment (employment)
and level of education is widely studied in the economic literature. The ﬁgures
show that, independently of gender, an increase in the level of education has a
positive eﬀect on the probability of employment.
Figure 4: Rates of unemployment, by education levels and by gender
As in de la Fuente, and to allow for an easier comparison of the results, in eqs.
(1) and (2),t h ee ﬀect of education on the probability of employment is measured
by   ≡
p0
p0. I follow his procedure in computing this parameter. Evidently, p(S)
= (1 − u(S)),w h e r eu(S) is the rate of unemployment for individuals with
a level of education S. OECD (2000) provides the gender-speciﬁc rates of
unemployment in 1996 by three diﬀerent level of education. It is then possible
to approximate the average increase in probability of employment, p0 (S0).
During the years of schooling, the probability of entering the labour market
is, in general, lower. In order to consider how this aﬀects the private return of an
individual, de la Fuente computes the probability to be employed while in school
using a factor of correction η. I evaluate this factor using the unemployment
rates, by gender, of the young population in-education and not—in-education.
The data are taken from OECD (2000) and refer to 1998.
I postpone further explanations of the data and of the details of the compu-
tations to Appendix B.
The tax system is extremely important in this kind of analysis and it aﬀects
the private returns on education in many diﬀerent ways. Given the focus of this
paper and given the basic features of family structure in the European coun-
tries considered, I introduce two diﬀerent types of tax-payers in the analysis.
I assume that, while in school, individuals are taxed as single. After school,
they are taxed as members of a two working parents- two children family. Con-
sequently, my result are not directly comparable to the ones by de la Fuente
(2003). Indeed, in most countries (but Denmark, Portugal and UK), marginal
tax rates are diﬀerent for the two types of tax-payers. In all the countries, the
average income tax (τ0) rates are lower for a family with 2 children than for a
single. The data refer to 2000 (OECD (2002)). I use them in the computa-
tion of the private returns independently of gender (however, tax rates may be
diﬀerent across gender because the individual incomes of men and women are
diﬀerent, by assumption).
Concerning beneﬁts, the analysis is more complicated. In the model, I con-
sider two diﬀerent categories of beneﬁts: the ﬁrst one refers to unemployment.
T h es e c o n dk i n do fb e n e ﬁts are related to maternity and, mostly, gender speciﬁc.
10Unemployment beneﬁts are computed as the sum of two components. One
captures the beneﬁts related to previous net earnings (a), while the second
captures beneﬁts that are assumed to be related to average net earnings (b).
The net (after tax) replacement rates (a + b) are diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of
family (single, married, couple with 2 children, lone parent with 2 children), so
that the values I obtain diﬀer (also for men) from the ones used in de la Fuente.
Table 2: Tax rates and unemployment beneﬁts, by gender
Figure 5: Net replacement rates, by component and by gender
The net replacement rates, showed in the table, vary a lot across countries
and are best seen as just an approximation of the actual beneﬁts y s t e m .T h i s
is conﬁrmed for Belgium. In this country, a more detailed analysis (see, de
la Croix and Vanderberghe (2004)) estimates a net replacement rate of 34%.
Compared to de la Fuente (66%) and to the value I consider, this is much lower.
The absence of comparable data for the 14 UE countries and the complexity of
the analysis forced me to use the data from OECD (1999). For the criteria used
to assign the values, see Appendix B.
The second kind of beneﬁts I consider in the model is related to maternity.
In this case, we must keep into account the position of the individual woman in
the labour market. In all the European countries, in order to reconcile women’s
family-life and work, the law establishes, for a working-woman, the right to
leave her job for a period of time for maternity and child-care. A fraction of this
period is paid (by the ﬁrms or by the public insurance system, this diﬀerence
is irrelevant for the aim of this paper). I consider the money amounts that
women receive during this time (i.e. maternity, childcare and parental leaves
due to maternity) as a "beneﬁt" (γ) that they can obtain if they work and have
a child. Moreover, for all the women having a child, independently of their
position in the labour market, usually the government pays a cash beneﬁts (δ).
The child beneﬁt programs, as we can see from the ﬁgure, diﬀer dramatically in
the 14 countries. These policies have a relevant impact on the labor market. In
general, it is shown that the ﬁrst kind of beneﬁts increase the participation rate
for women, while the second one has a negative eﬀect on it, because it increases
the opportunity cost of work and, therefore, the reservation wage of women. All
my calculations and the source, referred to both kinds of beneﬁts, are explicitly
described in Appendix B.
Figure 6: Child beneﬁts, by component
As explained above, the negative relationship between fertility rates and
education is an important component of my analysis. The ﬁgures show that
the (presumed) negative relation is conﬁrmed for most countries, with average
fertility rates of 1.56% ,1.28% and 1.09%, respectively, for low, medium and
high levels of education.
Figure 7: Fertility rate by education levels in 14 UE countries
11To evaluate "if" and "how" this aﬀect the private returns on education of
women, I introduce a new variable q(S),d e ﬁned as the fraction of the (full-time)
working life when the representative woman does not have maternal leaves.
Then, (1−q(S)) is the fraction of her active life which can be spent on maternal
leaves (we can think of this as the time immediately before and after the birth











where the fertility rate c
w(S) (c is the number of children, w is the number of
women in fertility age) is a decreasing function of schooling. I multiply the
average number of children per woman by the fraction of working life a woman
can spend caring (full time) for each child to measure the time women spend
oﬀ-work in average in each country for maternity-related reasons.
The marginal eﬀect of education on fertility is captured by the parameter
ξ =
q0
q0 . To estimate it, I use the same methodology used to estimate the
sensitivity of the probability of employment (see Appendix B). The most recent
and comparable data I found to compute it are in U.N.C.E (diﬀerent years)
and refer to women aged 20-49 (for some countries the age groups are diﬀerent,
see Table 14). For Denmark and UK, these data are unavailable and I use
ad i ﬀerent source which provides fertility rates by education in 1979 (Jones
(1982)). Considering the European countries (Finland, France, Italy and Spain)
for which fertility rates by education are available from both sources, one can
see that they decreased of about 33% during the last two decades. To keep into
account the general tendency of fertility rates to decrease during this period, I
weight the value of 1979 by 2/3 in order to correct the original estimates. For
Ireland, I simply assume the same value as of UK.
Table 3: Fertility rates, by education levels, and their sensitivity to education
Direct private education costs are determined as above. Following de la
Fuente, I deﬁne the direct private costs of schooling µs as a fraction of APW
gross earnings. It’s computed as the weighted average of secondary and tertiary
levels by 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. The costs are net of direct public subsidies
to student and, therefore, µs has a negative value when these subsidies exceed
tuition and other direct costs. For men, I use the data from de la Fuente (2003).
For women, given that female average earnings are estimated at 67%APW, the
parameter deﬁning direct private costs of education as a fraction of the female
earning is 1.5µs, so that the actual monetary costs are the same.
Figure 8: Direct private costs of schooling, by gender
Table 4: Direct private costs of schooling, by gender
124 Comparing private returns
My aim is to estimate and compare the private returns on education of men and
women. Once I have obtained the values of the right-hand sides of equations
(1) and (2), the values of rW and rM can be estimated (by numerical methods).
Figure 9 shows my estimates of rW and rM for the fourteen European coun-
tries.
Figure 9: Private rates of return on education in UE, by gender
We can immediately see that for most (to be precise, 10 out of 14) of the
countries, rW is larger than rM.
For men, private returns range, for most countries, between 6,5% and 11%,
with an average of 8,71%. The minimum value, 5,53%, is in Sweden, while the
estimated values exceed 12% in Portugal and UK and are over 10% in France
and Ireland.
Let’s ﬁrst focus on men.
Table 5: Private rates of return on education, by component, men
The table displays the numerical values of the rates of return for men and





























The numerator represents the marginal gain due to an increase in schooling,
while the denominator measures the marginal net costs.
In general, the key component of marginal costs are opportunity costs. Just
in two countries (France and Spain) direct cost exceeds 2% of instantaneous
net earnings. Given that a negative value of direct costs implies government
subsidies in excess of private costs, in some countries, like Denmark and Sweden,
subsidies are particularly generous. On the other hand, opportunity costs are
(at the margin) always above 74% of net earnings.
Similarly, if we consider the composition of the numerator, we can say that
the main component of the payoﬀsd e p e n d so nt h ec o e ﬃcient of the Mincerian
equation, rather that on the eﬀects of education on the probability of employ-
ment.
Let’s now consider women. For most of the countries, the private returns of
women lie between 7% and 12%, with an average of 9,50%. They are much lower
than the average in Sweden (5,70%) and in Netherlands (5,36%). For Ireland,
Portugal and UK, the rates are much higher than the average: 15,55%, 12,44%
and 13,85%, respectively.
Table 6: Private rate of returns on education, by component, women
13Remember the equation determining the rates of return for women,
(2)
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where k0 = p0 (q0 +( 1− q0)γ)+( 1− p0)(a + b)+( 1− q0)δ.
Its interpretation does not diﬀer substantially from the one of the equation
for men as explained in section 2. As in the case of men, by large, the most
important component of costs are opportunity costs (even if, due to the lower
net earnings, direct costs are somewhat more relevant).
Here, the variables aﬀecting marginal beneﬁts (i.e., the numerator) are three
rather than two: θ measures the eﬀect that an increase in education has on the
earning function f(S),  captures the eﬀect of the increase in education on the
probability of employment, while the new variable ξ measures the change of the
fertility rate induced by an increase in the level of education. Comparing the
weights of the components of the numerator, we can observe that the eﬀects of
  and ξ are quite low. The most important component of the numerator is, as
before, related to the coeﬃcient of the Mincerian equation. This is made clear
in the next table.
Table 7: Contributions of Mincerian, employment and fertility eﬀects of
education to RW
The three columns report the part of RW which is due to the eﬀects of
education on earnings (Mincerian eﬀect), on the probability of employment
and on fertility (for instance, the ﬁrst column is obtained from table 6, as
(θ × (weight of θ)/NUM)RW).
The eﬀects of education on probability of employment and fertility together
contributes at most 0.6% to the value of RW. The values of the eﬀects vary a
lot across countries, depending also on the policy parameters. While usually
smaller, the fertility eﬀect is of the same order as the employment eﬀect.
To understand what is the eﬀect of both kinds of child beneﬁts on the private
returns, I numerically compute the elasticities of RW with respect to γ and δ,
Eγ and Eδ, for the 14 countries. As shown in table 6, in all the countries, the
numerical values of the elasticities of RW with respect to γ and δ, Eγ and Eδ,
for the 14 countries are negative but not so high. Hence, an increase in both δ
and γ from the government implies a weak decrease in women’s private returns.
5C o n c l u s i o n
My aim was to compare the returns to education of men and women.
My results conﬁrm that education is an important determinant of individual
earning for both genders. Somewhat surprisingly, in most countries, women
14returns are higher than male returns. The key fact explaining this diﬀerence
is that the coeﬃcients of the Mincerian equations used in this paper are larger
for women. This more than compensates the negative eﬀects on women rates
of return caused by their higher rates of unemployment and by the eﬀects of
maternity related leaves (always paid less than the full wage).
Ia l s oe s t i m a t et h ee ﬀects on the female rates of returns of the policy para-
meters related to maternity.
As mentioned in the introduction, my estimates are best seen as an upper
bound on the actual values of the returns. This is because of several reasons,
related both to the structure of the model and to the values of the parameters
used in the paper.
With respect to the second issue, I used OCDE (1999) estimates of replace-
ment rates for unemployed individuals. As mentioned above, independent esti-
mates for Belgium (de la Croix and Vanderberghe (2004)) suggest that, for this
country, actual replacement rates are substantially lower. Given that unem-
ployment rates for women are higher, overestimates of replacement rates would
have a larger eﬀect on the values of rW than on the ones of rM. Also, in my es-
timates I ignore the time-dependence of maternity and unemployment beneﬁts
and this probably induces a larger overestimate for women.
Also, I impute only to women the share of maternity beneﬁts which are
n o te m p l o y m e n tr e l a t e d( m e a s u r e da b o v eb yδ). Given that these beneﬁts are
given to families and not just to women members of the labor force, the way I
treated them could have caused some additional overestimate of female returns
as compared to men returns.
There are two additional possible sources of overestimate of the diﬀerences in
the gender speciﬁc rates of return. As in de la Fuente (2003), I consider expected
lifetime returns. Given that women’s rates of unemployment are higher than
men’s ones, female incomes are probably more variable over time. This has no
eﬀect on my estimate of R, but could have important eﬀects on actual well-being
of (risk-averse) individuals.
Finally, I do not take into account that the rates of participation to the labor
force are much lower for women, because I consider the proﬁle of earning of an
individual retiring at the average age.
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207 Appendix A: Derivation of equations (2), (3),
and (4)
For convenience, in this appendix, I will omit the subscript W.
The point of departure is given by the ﬁrst order condition of the optimiza-
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Dividing (A.1) by A0e−RS0 and rearranging terms, I obtain
(A.2)
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DENOM ≡− ηp0 [(1 − φ)f (S0) − T ((1 − φ)f (S0))] + µ0f (S0)+
{q0 [p0 (1 − γ)] + pγ +( 1− p0)(a + b)+( 1− q0)δ}(f (S0) − T (f (S0))).
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N o w ,l e tm ec o m p u t et h ee ﬀects of changes in the policy parameters (γ,δ) on
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(1 − e−RH)
2 ≥ 0,
because its numerator is equal to 0 when R =0and it is easily checked to be
an increasing function of R (clearly, the denominator is always non-negative).
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238A p p e n d i x B : D e ﬁnition and sources of data
8.1 Mincerian wage equation
The instruments that I use to evaluate the eﬀects on earning of one additional
year of schooling (θM and θW) are the microeconomic Mincerian wage equations.
They measure the average log increase in gross wages, before income taxes and
employee social security contributions. In order to assign a value to θ for 1995,
I use the results in Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001). They
analyze, for both men and women, the evolution in time of the Mincer equations
for most of the European countries using an OLS model. I use their values for
all countries, except for Belgium. For this country, the only available estimate
of the Mincer parameters is in de la Croix and Vanderberghe (2004).
Table 8:M i n c e r i a nc o e ﬃcients θ, by gender
8.2 Age of retirement and working life
To compute the expected length of the working life for men and women in each
county (HM and HW), I subtract from the average ages of retirement (UM and
UW) the maximum values between the average years of schooling (S0M and
S0W) plus six (the age when an individual start schooling) and 14, the minimal
legal age for entering the labour market.
For the average ages of retirement, I use the values estimated, for 1995, in
Blondal and Scarpetta (1999). The paper provides data for both men and
women.
The average years of schooling refer to 2002 and are taken from OECD
(2002).
Figure 10: Average age of retirement in 14 European countries, by gender
Table 9: Data used to compute the length of the working life
8.3 Probability of employment
The probability to be employed, conditional on participation in the labour force,
p(S), is calculated as (1−u(S)),w h e r eu(S) i st h er a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n t .T h i s
probability typically changes with the level of education. The data on total and
by education rates of unemployment for men and women refer to the population
between 25 and 64 years of age in 1996 (OECD(2000)).
First, I consider the marginal increment of the probability for each level
of education divided by the cumulate years of schooling associated with the
attainment levels S(n) (see, de la Fuente and Domemech (2002)), using the




24where 1 denotes below upper secondary education, 2 upper secondary education
and 3 tertiary education. Then, I compute p0 (S) as the weighted average of the




p(S) . The correction factor, 2/3, is used to capture the fact that
the probability of employment depends on many other factors, diﬀerent from
education.
Table 10: Data used to compute the sensitivity to education of the probability
of employment , by gender
To calculate the correction factor η, I use the data on education and work
status for men and women reported in OECD (2000). This study refers to
individuals in the 20-24 age group in 1998. For both sexes, η is obtain dividing
the probabilities of employment of young people in school by the employment
probabilities of young people out of school. When the obtained value is larger
than 1, I assign the value 1. Since data for Austria and Ireland are not available I
assign to these countries the values obtained for Germany and UK, respectively.
Table 11: Data used to compute η
8.4 Taxes and unemployment beneﬁts
Average (τ0)a n dm a r g i n a lt a x e s( T
0
) ,r e f e rt oam a r r i e dc o u p l ew i t ht w oc h i l -
dren (4-12 years of age) and are taken from OECD (2002), assuming that men
earn 100% of APW and women 67% of APW. I use the same source of de la
Fuente to make easier the comparison between the tax rates for the two dif-
ferent levels of income and types of households. To evaluate the marginal tax
for students (τs), I use the data from de la Fuente (2003). Bear in mind that
OECD data deﬁne the marginal tax rate as the rate applied to an increase in
the income of the main earner, here, by assumption, the husband. Evidently,
the actual marginal tax rates on women’s wage may be lower (because we are
assuming that their wages are lower). This may induce an underestimation of
the actual returns to education for women.
Unemployment beneﬁts vary a lot across the EU countries considered. In
some, there are only beneﬁts proportional to previous earning (PW, this implies
that b =0 ), in other countries they are ﬁxed (FR, a =0 ) and in some others they
are mixed: part of the unemployed have a ﬁx subsidy, while the remaining part
of population has beneﬁts related to the previous earning (MIX, a 6=0 ,b6=0 ).
To determine the appropriate values of a and b, I assume that the percentages
of people in the various groups discussed above are the same as estimated by de
la Fuente. Hence, I assume that the distribution is gender-independent. The
values of a and b for men and women are diﬀerent because of the assumption of
diﬀerent earnings as a percentage of APW. Table 12 describes how I compute
the values of a and b, by gender.
Table 12: Derivation of unemployment beneﬁts, by gender
258.5 Maternity, parental and childcare leaves and child cash
beneﬁts
The beneﬁts related to maternity include two diﬀerent components. The ﬁrst
one (γ) is assigned only to employed women. I measure it as a % of the previous
earnings and I compute this variable dividing the paid maternity, childcare and
parental leaves (I do not include leaves reserved to the father) in years by the
(max) total number of years that they can have, by law, as paid and unpaid
leaves. I report in Table 13 the variables used for the computation, that refer
to 1999 (Jaumotte (2003)).
The amount of cash beneﬁts (δ) refers to 2000 (OECD (2002)) and to a
representative family with two children (the case of twins is excluded). In most
of the UE countries there is a ﬁx transfer for each child and the amount does
not change with previous earning. The exception is Italy, where it decreases
with earning. To ﬁt in the model, the monetary amount is converted into a
percentage of the average earnings of women population in each countries.
Table 13: Cash transfers and derivation of childcare beneﬁts
8.6 Sensitivity of fertility to education
The marginal eﬀe c to fe d u c a t i o no nf e r t i l i t ya ﬀects the parameter ξ =
q0
q0,w h e r e
q0 is the increment of q(S) due to an increase in schooling (hence, in general,
to a decrease in fertility). I use the data of total and by education fertility
rates and I follow the same methodology used to approximate the sensitivity of
probability of employment ( ).
First, I consider the marginal increase of the fertility rate for each level
of education divided by the cumulate years of schooling associated with the




where 1 denotes below upper secondary education, 2 upper secondary education
and 3 tertiary education. Then, I compute q0 (S) as the weighted average of the




q(S) . The correction factor, 2/3, is used to capture the fact that the fertility
rate depends on many other factors, diﬀerent from education.
Table 14: Data used to compute the sensitivity of fertility to education,ξ
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Table 1: Parameters and variables used to compute of private rates  
of return to schooling, by gender 
 
 Parameters 
   
g=  1,5%, rate of exogenous productivity growth 
 
φ=  0,8 is the fraction of time taken up by full-time school attendance  
 
1- φ=  0,2 is the potential labour supply of students 
 
   
 Variable   s
   






average retirement age in 1995, for women 
 
S0M= average years of schooling of men in 2002 
S0W=  average years of schooling of women in 2002 
 
HM= U-Max (S0M+6, 14)= estimated length of the working life of men 
HW=  U-Max (S0W+6, 14)= estimated length of the working life of women 
 
θM= microeconomic Mincerian returns to schooling for men in 1995. It measures the average 
increase in gross wage due to an additional year of schooling 
θW=  microeconomic Mincerian returns to schooling for women in 1995 
 
µs=  direct private (net) costs of scholing for men, measured as a fraction of APW gross earning 
1.5µs=  direct private (net) costs of scholing for women, measured as a fraction of APW gross earning 
 
p0M=  probability of employment after school for men, conditional on participation in the labour 
force 
p0W=  probability of employment after school for women, conditional on participation in the labour 
force 
 
pSM=  ηMp0M= probability of employment for a students (men), conditional on participation in the 
labour force 
pSW=  ηWp0W= probability of employment for a students (women), conditional on participation in the 
labour force 
 
ηM=  correction factor for students, calculated as the ratio between the probability of employment 
of young (men) active population in education and not in education 
ηW=  correction factor for students, calculated as the ratio between the probability of employment 
of young (women) active population in education and not in education 
 
єM=  Captures the effect of the increase in education on the probability of employment, for men 
W=  Captures the effect of the increase in education on the probability of employment, for women 
 
τ0=  average tax rate 
τS=  average tax rate applied to a worker earning 20% of APW 
T’=  marginal tax rate 
 
aM=  component of net remplacement rate of men linked to previus earnings 
aW=  component of net remplacement rate of women linked to previus earnings 
 
bM=  component of net remplacement rate of men not linked to previus earnings 
bW=  component of net remplacement rate of women not linked to previus earnings 
 
γ=  maternity, childcare and parential leave benefits for women as a % of previus earning 
δ=  Childacare related cash benefits from government  
 
q0=  1-c/w*d/H= fraction of the (full-time) working life when the representative woman does not 
have maternal leaves, (1- q0) is the fraction of her active life which can be spent on maternal 
leaves 
c/w=  fertility rate of women, a decreasing function of education 




  28Table 2: Tax rates and unemployment benefits, by gender 
 
Tax rates1 Unemployment benefits2
Average Student  Marginal  MEN  Women  Country 
τ o  Τ s3 T' aM b M aW a W
               
AUSTRIA 25,30%  18,20%  42,90%  73% 0  79% 0 
BELGIUM 39,00%  13,07%  55,90%  0 60%  0% 75% 
DENMARK 42,80%  20,04%  50,70%  0 77%  0% 95% 
FINLAND 31,10%  23,20%  48,00% 43% 41% 49% 45% 
FRANCE 22,90%  18,01%  25,80%  74% 0  86% 0 
GERMANY 32,60%  20,50%  54,80%  73% 1%  73% 1% 
GREECE 17,40%  15,90%  28,50%  46% 0  48% 0 
IRELAND 16,40%  2,00%  28,50%  0 62%  0% 73% 
ITALY 25,50%  9,19%  40,40%  51% 3%  49% 3% 
NETHERLANDS 34,20%  10,52%  53,10%  80% 5%  86% 4% 
PORTUGAL 15,20%  11,00%  25,00%  77% 0  86% 0 
SPAIN 13,70%  6,35%  28,80%  74% 0  78% 0 
SWEDEN 32,00%  24,21%  35,20%  0 84%  0% 90% 
UK 21,90%  0,00%  32,00%  0 64%  0% 83% 
               
AVERAGE  Coun.  26,43%  13,73%  39,26% 42% 28% 45% 33% 
 
            1. Source OECD (2002). 
            2. Source OECD (1999). 





Table 3: Fertility rates, by education levels, and their sensitivity to education 
 
Total fertility rate by education Sensitivity
Country Age  group 
Low Medium  High  ξ 
           
AUSTRIA                      20-39  1,10 1,10  1,10  0.0000 
BELGIUM                    21-39  1,39 1,08  1,09  0,0013 
DENMARK*                 25-49  1,47 1,47  1,24  0,0021 
FINLAND                     25-49  1,97 1,64  1,35  0,0016 
FRANCE                       20-49  1,88 1,38  1,10  0,0077 
GERMANY                  20-39  1,25 1,05  1,07  0,0025 
GREECE   20-49  1,87 1,37  1,01  0,0012 
IRELAND*   25-49  1,43 1,43  1,18  0,0002 
ITALY   20-49  1,52 1,07  0,88  0,0015 
NETHERLANDS    20-42  1,38 1,17  0,76  0,0010 
PORTUGAL  20-49  1,71 1,07  1,11  0,0037 
SPAIN   20-49  1,65 1,16  1  0,0050 
SWEDEN   20-49  1,80 1,46  1,26  0,0025 
UK*   25-49  1,43 1,43  1,18  0,0001 
           
AVERAGE Coun.    1,56 1,28  1,09  0,0022 
 
                          Source: U.N.C.E.. 








  29Table 4: Direct private costs of schooling, by gender 
 
Direct private costs Country 
Men Women* 
     
AUSTRIA -1,40%  -2,10% 
BELGIUM 0,32%  0,48% 
DENMARK -4,44%  -6,66% 
FINLAND -1,84%  -2,76% 
FRANCE 1,94%  2,91% 
GERMANY 0,00%  0,00% 
GREECE 0,98%  1,47% 
IRELAND 0,73%  1,09% 
ITALY 0,74%  1,11% 
NETHERLANDS -1,34%  -2,01% 
PORTUGAL -0,33%  -0,49% 
SPAIN 4,05%  6,07% 
SWEDEN -5,80%  -7,62% 
UK 0,94%  1,41% 
     
AVERAGE Coun.  -0,39%  -0,51% 
 
           Source: de la Fuente (2003). 





































  30Table 5: Private rates of return on education, by components, men 
 
Country rM(%) RM (%)  DENOM   Opp. costs  Direct costs 
           
AUSTRIA  8,02 6,52  0,7681  0,7870 -0,0189 
BELGIUM  6,43 4,93  0,7651  0,7597 0,0054 
DENMARK  9,27 7,77  0,6751  0,7539 -0,0789 
FINLAND  8,51 7,01  0,8379  0,8653 -0,0274 
FRANCE  10,29 8,79  0,8279  0,8021 0,0258 
GERMANY  8,29 6,79  0,7784  0,7784  0 
GREECE  7,34 5,84  0,8660  0,8538 0,0122 
IRELAND  11,29 9,79  0,7903  0,7811 0,0091 
ITALY  6,62 5,12  0,8895  0,8792 0,0102 
NETHERLANDS  7,13 5,63  0,7232  0,7437 -0,0248 
PORTUGAL  12,12 10,62 0,8082  0,8122 -0,0039 
SPAIN  7,88 6,38  0,9098  0,8611 0,0487 
SWEDEN  5,53 4,03  0,7645  0,8510 -0,0866 
UK  12,06 1,06  0,7703  0,7579 0,0124 
           
























         
 NUM    Є  weight   Є  θ weigh  θ 
           
AUSTRIA  0,0538 0,004035  0,2626 0,069  0,7644 
BELGIUM  0,0437 0,010728  0,3841 0,057  0,6942 
DENMARK  0,0544 0,009789  0,2189 0,064  0,8161 
FINLAND  0,0623 0,011388  0,1390 0,086  0,7063 
FRANCE  0,0746 0,010140  0,2419 0,075  0,9629 
GERMANY  0,0564 0,014137  0,2443 0,079  0,6701 
GREECE  0,0544 -0,000245  0,5282 0,063  0,8656 
IRELAND  0,0783 0,018303  0,3546 0,090  0,7981 
ITALY  0,0506 0,002493  0,4442 0,062  0,7985 
NETHERLANDS  0,0457 0,006375  0,1452 0,063  0,7114 
PORTUGAL  0,0862 0,001860  0,2205 0,097  0,8844 
SPAIN  0,0615 0,009115  0,2319 0,072  0,8250 
SWEDEN  0,0368 0,005049  0,1475 0,041  0,8786 
UK  0,0824 0,014851  0,3404 0,094  0,8232 
           



















  31Table 6: Private rates of return on education, by components, women 
 
Country rW% Rw  %  DENOM   Direct costs  Opp. costs   NUM   
             
AUSTRIA 7,64  6,14  0,7563  -0,0288 0,7851  0,0509 
BELGIUM 6,64  5,14  0,7778 0,0082  0,7696  0,0470 
DENMARK 6,88  5,38  0,6402  -0,1175 0,7577  0,0390 
FINLAND 8,30  6,80  0,8249  -0,0430 0,8679  0,0599 
FRANCE 10,92  9,42  0,8409 0,0405  0,8004  0,0808 
GERMANY 10,16  8,66 0,7649 0.0000  0,7649  0,0685 
GREECE 9,92  8,42  0,8764  0,0190 0,8572  0,0757 
IRELAND 15,55  14,05  0,7933 0,0137  0,7857  0,1126 
ITALY 7,95  6,45  0,9389  0,0160 0,9230  0,0649 
NETHERLANDS 5.36  3,86  0,7220 -0,0310  0,7530  0,0371 
PORTUGAL 12,44  10,94 0,8025  -0,0063 0,8088  0,0883 
SPAIN 9,03  7,53  0,9525  0,0794 0,8731  0,0747 
SWEDEN 5,70  4,20  0,6936  -0,1320 0,8256  0,0347 
UK 13,85  12,35  0,7753  0,0185 0,7568  0,0964 
             
AVERAGE Coun.  9,50  8,00  0,8038 -0,0084  0,8122  0,0681 
 
  Є  Weight Є  ξ Weight  ξ  θ Weight  θ  Eγ Eδ
                 
AUSTRIA  0,003406 0,1736  0.0000 0,2446  0,067  0,7514  - 0.0082  - 0.0301  
BELGIUM  0,019656 0,2061  0,0013 0,3256  0,065  0,6541  - 0.0204  - 0.0252  
DENMARK 0,009614  0,0364  0,0021  0,0975  0,049  0,7839  - 0.0859  - 0.0211 
FINLAND 0,018491  -0,0305  0,0016  0,3863  0,088  0,6804  - 0.0022  - 0.0380 
FRANCE 0,015531  0,0659  0,0077  0,3649  0,081  0,9505  - 0.0589  - 0.0290 
GERMANY  0,006163 0,1837  0,0025 0,6870  0,098  0,6691  - 0.0198  - 0.0193* 
GREECE 0,000863  0,4816  0,0012 0,6751  0,086 0,8656  - 0.0076  - 0.0043* 
IRELAND  0,020719 0,2374  0,0002 0,5125  0,137  0,7856  - 0.0012   - 0.0025 
ITALY  0,006538 0,4392  0,0015 0,4709  0,077  0,7963  - 0.0184  - 0.0021 
NETHERLANDS 0,007332  0,0849 0,0010  0,3233  0,051  0,7093  - 0.0448  - 0.0130  
PORTUGAL 0,001651  0,0793 0,0037  0,7197  0,097  0,8795  - 0.0111  - 0.0121 
SPAIN  0,016061 0,1205  0,0050 0,7023  0,084  0,8250  - 0.0075  - 0.0180* 
SWEDEN 0,010019  0,0624  0,0025  0,3419  0,038  0,8743  - 0.0734  - 0.0407 
UK  0,006739 0,1472  0,0001 0,5957  0,115  0,8286  - 0.0017  - 0.0038 
                 
AVERAGE Coun.  0,010413  0,1712  0,0022 0,4597  0,080 0,7905  - 0.0206  - 0.0133 
 



















  32Table 7: Contribution of the Mincerian, employment and fertility effects to RW 
 
Country  Mincerian effect   Employment effect  Fertility effect  Rw
         
AUSTRIA 0.06067  0,00071  0.00000  0.06138 
BELGIUM 0.04650  0.00443  0.00046  0.05139 
DENMARK 0.05302  0.00048 0.00028  0.53278 
FINLAND 0.06794  -0.00064  0.00071  0.06801 
FRANCE 0.08974  0.00119  0.00336  0.09419 
GERMANY 0.08297  0.00143 0.00217  0.08657 
GREECE 0.08286  0.00046 0.00092  0.08424 
IRELAND 0.13424  0.00614  0.00012  0.14050 
ITALY 0.06096  0.00285 0.00070  0.06451 
NETHERLANDS 0.03763  0.00065  0.00035  0.03863 
PORTUGAL 0.10566  0.00046 0.00331  0.10943 
SPAIN 0.06982  0.00195 0.00353  0.07530 
SWEDEN 0.04018  0.00076 0.00102  0.04196 
UK 0.12213  0.00127 0.00011  0.12351 
         










     
AUSTRIA  0,069 0,067 
BELGIUM* 0,057  0,065 
DENMARK 0,064  0,049 
FINLAND 0,086  0,088 
FRANCE 0,075  0,081 
GERMANY 0,079  0,098 
GREECE 0,063  0,086 
IRELAND 0,090  0,137 
ITALY 0,062  0,077 
NETHERLANDS 0,063  0,051 
PORTUGAL 0,097  0,097 
SPAIN 0,072  0,084 
SWEDEN 0,041  0,038 
UK 0,094  0,115 
     
AVERAGE Coun.  0,072286  0,080929 
 
                                                           Source: Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (2001). 


























































  Men 
Country  UM1 S0M2   S0M +6  Max(S0M +6,14)  HM
           
AUSTRIA  58,6 11,5  17,5  17,5  41,1 
BELGIUM  57,6 11,2  17,2  17,2  40,4 
DENMARK  62,7 13,3  19,3  19,3  43,4 
FINLAND  59 12,3  18,3  18,3  40,7 
FRANCE  59,2 11  17  17  42,2 
GERMANY  60,5 13,6  19,6  19,6  40,9 
GREECE  62,3 10,7  16,7  16,7  45,6 
IRELAND  63,4 12,6  18,6  18,6  44,8 
ITALY  60,6 9,6 15,6  15,6  45 
NETHERLANDS  58,8 13,7  19,7  19,7  39,1 
PORTUGAL  63,6 7,9 13,9  14 49,6 
SPAIN  61,4 10,4  16,4  16,4  45 
SWEDEN  63,3 12,2  18,2  18,2  45,1 
UK  62,7 12,7  18,7  18,7  44 
           
AVERAGE Coun.  60,9 11,6      43,4 
          
  Women
  UW1 S0W2 S0W +6  Max(S0W +6,14)  HW
           
AUSTRIA  56,5 11  17  17  39,5 
BELGIUM  54,1 11,1  17,1  17,1  37 
DENMARK  59,4 13,4  19,4  19,4  40 
FINLAND  58,9 12,5  18,5  18,5  40,4 
FRANCE  58,3 10,7  16,7  16,7  41,6 
GERMANY  58,4 13,1  19,1  19,1  39,3 
GREECE  60,3 10,3  16,3  16,3  44 
IRELAND  60,1 12,8  18,8  18,8  41,3 
ITALY  57,2 9,2 15,2  15,2  42 
NETHERLANDS  55,3 13,3  19,3  19,3  36 
PORTUGAL  60,8 8,1 14,1  14,1 46,7 
SPAIN  58,9 10,3  16,3  16,3  42,6 
SWEDEN  62,1 12,6  18,6  18,6  43,5 
UK  59,7 12,6  18,6  18,6  41,1 
           
AVERAGE Coun.  58,6 11,5      41,1 
 1. Source: Blondal and Scarpetta (1999). 

















  34Table 10: Data used to compute the sensitivity of the probability of employment to education, by gender 
 
  MEN  
 u(s)  (1-u(S)) 
Country low  medium  high 
Total 
unempl  low med. high 
p(s)  p'(s)%  p'/p %               ЄM
                       
AUSTRIA  0,0629 0,0337  0,0222 0,0373  0,9371 0,9663 0,9778  0,96273 0,5827  0,6053  0,004035 
BELGIUM  0,1042 0,0427  0,0260 0,0645  0,8958 0,9573 0,9739  0,93548 1,5054  1,6092  0,010728 
DENMARK  0,1053 0,0636  0,0434 0,0679  0,8947 0,9364 0,9566  0,93215 1,3687  1,4683  0,009789 
FINLAND  0,2053 0,1662  0,0796 0,1528  0,7947 0,8339 0,9205  0,84725 1,4473  1,7082  0,011388 
FRANCE  0,1338 0,0808  0,0562 0,0918  0,8662 0,9192 0,9438  0,90826 1,3815  1,5210  0,010140 
GERMANY  0,1571 0,0808 0,05 0,0801  0,8429 0,9192  0,95  0,91988 1,9506 2,1205 0,014137 
GREECE  0,0459 0,0481  0,0464 0,0462  0,9542 0,9519 0,9536  0,95376  -0,035 -0,0367 -0,000245 
IRELAND  0,1621 0,0605  0,0360 0,1036  0,8379 0,9395 0,9639  0,89645 2,4611  2,7454  0,018303 
ITALY  0,0742 0,0456  0,0501 0,0617  0,9258 0,9544 0,9499  0,93831 0,3509  0,3740  0,002493 
NETHERLANDS  0,0576 0,0302  0,0292 0,0374  0,9424 0,9698 0,9708  0,96262 0,9205  0,9562  0,006375 
PORTUGAL  0,0562 0,0533  0,0275 0,0529  0,9438 0,9468 0,9725  0,94706 0,2642  0,2790  0,001860 
SPAIN  0,1667 0,1047  0,0833 0,1407  0,8333 0,8954 0,9167  0,85928 1,1748  1,3672  0,009115 
SWEDEN  0,1138 0,0994  0,0551 0,0914  0,8862 0,9006 0,9449  0,90857 0,6881  0,7573  0,005049 
UK  0,1583 0,0809  0,0419 0,0826  0,8418 0,9191 0,9581  0,9174 2,0436  2,2276  0,014851 
                       
AVERAGE Coun.   0,1145 0,0708  0,0462 0,0793 0,8855 0,9293 0,9538  0,9207 1,1503  1,2645  0,8429 
 
  WOMEN  
 u(s)  (1-u(S)) 
 low  medium  high 
Total 
unempl  low med. high  p(s)  p'(s)%  p'/p %               ЄW
                       
AUSTRIA 0,0577  0,0367  0,0199  0,04237 0,9423 0,9633 0,9801  0,95763 0,4893  0,5109  0,003406 
BELGIUM 0,2  0,1078  0,0390  0,11059  0,8 0,8922 0,9609  0,88941 2,6223  2,9484  0,019656 
DENMARK 0,1412  0,0875  0,0374  0,0894 0,8588 0,9125 0,9626  0,9106 1,3132  1,4421  0,009614 
FINLAND 0,2372  0,1596  0,0689  0,16 0,7628 0,8404 0,9311  0,84 2,3299  2,7737  0,018491 
FRANCE 0,1853  0,1111  0,0643  0,12453 0,8147 0,8889 0,9357  0,87547 2,0396  2,3297  0,015531 
GERMANY 0,1256  0,1011  0,0663  0,09653 0,8744 0,8989 0,9338  0,90347 0,8353  0,9245  0,006163 
GREECE 0,1279  0,1429  0,0896  0,12183 0,8721 0,8571 0,9105  0,87817 0,1136  0,1294  0,000863 
IRELAND 0,1929  0,0825  0,0429  0,10471 0,8071 0,9175 0,9571  0,89529 2,7825  3,1079  0,020719 
ITALY 0,1469  0,0833  0,0803  0,11561 0,8532 0,9167 0,9197  0,88439 0,8673  0,9807  0,006538 
NETHERLANDS 0,0877  0,0628 0,0379  0,06364 0,9123 0,9372 0,9621  0,93636 1,0298  1,0998  0,007332 
PORTUGAL 0,0766  0,0532 0,0272  0,06538 0,9234 0,9468 0,9728 0,93462 0,652  0,6976  0,001651 
SPAIN 0,2919  0,2128  0,1373  0,24339 0,7081 0,7872 0,8628  0,75661 1,8228  2,4092  0,016061 
SWEDEN 0,1306  0,0841  0,0420  0,07927 0,8694 0,9159 0,9579  0,92073 1,3838  1,5029  0,010019 
UK 0,0826  0,0512  0,0279  0,05376 0,9174 0,9488 0,9721  0,94624 0,9566  1,0109  0,006739 
                       


















  35Table 11: Data used to compute η 
 
Prob. Emplo. Popul. 20-24, MEN
in education  not in education  ratio in/out  Correction 
Final 
value  Countries 
total active  total active  total active  η p st= ηp0
                 
AUSTRIA*  n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a  1 0,9627 
BELGIUM  0,1051 0,7455  0,7754 0,8492 0,1355 0,8779 0,8779  0,8213 
DENMARK  0,6737 0,8649  0,8 0,9306 0,8421 0,9294 0,9294  0,8664 
FINLAND  0,2815 0,5507  0,6471 0,7938 0,435  0,6938  0,6938  0,5879 
FRANCE 0,1034  0,9796  0,6884 0,764 0,152  1,2822  1  0,9083 
GERMANY  0,4784 0,9881  0,807 0,8625 0,5928 1,1456  1  0,9199 
GREECE 0,0456 
 
0,5833  0,7431 0,7948 0,0614 0,7339 0,7339  0,7 
IRELAND*  n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a  1 0,8965 
ITALY 0,0108  0,375  0,6033  0,7311 0,0179 0,5129 0,5129  0,4813 
NETHERLANDS 0,5585  0,9197  0,8983  0,9447 0,6217 0,9735 0,9735  0,9371 
PORTUGAL 0,2071  0,8649 0,877  0,9266  0,2361 0,9334 0,9334 0,884 
SPAIN  0,099 0,5333  0,7047 0,7434 0,1405 0,7174 0,7174  0,6165 
SWEDEN 0,1725  0,6038  0,7297  0,833 0,2364 0,7248 0,7248  0,6586 
UK  0,4399 0,8951  0,8406 0,8804 0,5233 1,0167  1  0,9174 
                 
AVERAGE Coun.  0,2646  0,7419  0,7596 0,8378 0,3329 0,8785 0,8785  0,8641 
 
Prob. Emplo. Popul. 20-24, WOMEN
in education  not in education  ratio in/out  Correction 
Final 
value   
total active  total active  total active  η p st= ηp0
                 
AUSTRIA*  n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a  1 0,9576 
BELGIUM 0,0827  0,7  0,6522  0,8065 0,1268 0,8679 0,8679  0,7719 
DENMARK  0,6456 0,8498  0,682 0,9011 0,9466 0,9431 0,9431  0,8588 
FINLAND  0,2645 0,5432  0,657 0,8267 0,4026 0,6571 0,6571  0,5520 
FRANCE 0,1016  1  0,5531  0,6804 0,1837 1,4697  1  0,8755 
GERMANY 0,4684  0,9834  0,7177  0,89 0,6526 1,1049  1  0,9035 
GREECE 0,0455  0,4545  0,4687 0,6145  0,097 0,7396 0,7396  0,6495 
IRELAND*  n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a  0,9798 0,8772 
ITALY  0,0108 0,2222  0,4968 0,6688 0,0217 0,3322 0,3322  0,2938 
NETHERLANDS  0,576 0,9191  0,84 0,9613 0,6857 0,9561 0,9561  0,8953 
PORTUGAL 0,2081  0,8191 0,7841  0,9015  0,2654  0,9086 0,9086  0,8492 
SPAIN  0,0974 0,4261  0,5453 0,6216 0,1786 0,6855 0,6855  0,5186 
SWEDEN 0,223  0,7174  0,705 0,8711 0,3163 0,8236 0,8236  0,7583 
UK 0,4653  0,9038  0,7159 0,9224  0,65 0,9798 0,9798  0,9271 
                 
AVERAGE  Coun.  0,2657  0,71155  0,6515 0,805492  0,3773  0,8723  0,8481  0,759 
















  36Table 12: Derivation of unemployment benefits, by gender 
 





a (link. to 
prev.earns) 
b (not so 
link.) 
         
AUSTRIA  73% PW  73%  0 
BELGIUM  60% FR  0  60% 
DENMARK  77% FR  0  77% 
FINLAND  84% MIX  43%  41% 
FRANCE  74% PW  74%  0 
GERMANY  74% PW  73%  1% 
GREECE  46% PW  46%  0 
IRELAND  62% FR  0  62% 
ITALY  54% PW  51%  3% 
NETHERLANDS  85% PW  80%  5% 
PORTUGAL  77% PW  77%  0 
SPAIN  74% PW  74%  0 
SWEDEN  84% FR  0  84% 
UK  64% FR  0  64% 
         
AVERAGE Coun.  71%   42% 28% 
 





a (link. to 
prev.earns) 
b (not so 
link.) 
         
AUSTRIA  79% PW  79%  0 
BELGIUM  75% FR  0%  75% 
DENMARK  95% FR  0%  95% 
FINLAND  94% MIX  49%  45% 
FRANCE  86% PW  86%  0 
GERMANY  74% PW  73%  1% 
GREECE  48% PW  48%  0 
IRELAND  73% FR  0%  73% 
ITALY  52% PW  49%  3% 
NETHERLANDS  90% PW  86%  4% 
PORTUGAL  86% PW  86%  0 
SPAIN  78% PW  78%  0 
SWEDEN  90% FR  0%  90% 
UK  83% FR  0%  83% 
         
AVERAGE Coun.  79%   45% 33% 
 

















  37Table 13: Cash trasfers and derivation of childcare benefits 
 
Materniry, childcare 






d paid  d total  γ  δ 
         
AUSTRIA 0,73  1,65 44,20%  28,06% 
BELGIUM 0,59  1,28  46,30%  14,91% 
DENMARK 0,81  1,04 77,80%  10,08% 
FINLAND 1,05  3,15  33,50%  13,97% 
FRANCE 1,40  3,11 45,10% 9,06% 
GERMANY 0,73  3,11  23,50%  0% 
GREECE 0,15  0,56  27,60%  0% 
IRELAND 0,19  0,54  35,70%  7,17% 
ITALY 0,58  1,25  46,20%  2,26% 
NETHERLANDS 0,31  0,56 55,20% 9,30% 
PORTUGAL 0,33  2,32 14,10% 7,54% 
SPAIN 0,31  3,15  9,80%  0% 
SWEDEN 0,77  1,63 47,10%  13,28% 
UK 0,15  0,59  25,80% 10,60% 
         
AVERAGE Coun.  0,58  1,71 37,99% 9,02% 
 
 1.Measured in years. Source: Jaumotte (2003). 
 2.Recall that women earns 67% of APW. 
 3.Source: OECD (2002). 
 
 
Table 14: Data used to compute the sensitivity of q(S) to education 
 
TFR by education 
Country d  total  HW TFR q(S) 
low medium  high 
q'(S)                ξ 
                   
AUSTRIA  1,65 39,5 1,42 0,9407  1,1  1,1  1,1 0 0 
BELGIUM  1,28  37 1,55 0,9464  1,39 1,08  1,09 0,001817 0,001280 
DENMARK  1,04 40  1,8  0,9532  1,47  1,47  1,24 0,002933 0,002052 
FINLAND  3,15 40,4 1,81 0,8589 1,97  1,64 1,35  0,002078 0,001629 
FRANCE  3,11 41,6  1,7 0,8729 1,88  1,38  1,1  0,010036 0,007665 
GERMANY  3,11 39,3 1,25 0,9011 1,25  1,05 1,07  0,003378 0,002499 
GREECE  0,56  44 1,32 0,9832  1,87 1,37  1,01 0,001797 0,001218 
IRELAND  0,54 41,3 1,84 0,9759 1,43  1,43 1,18  0,000275 0,000188 
ITALY  1,25  42 1,18 0,9649  1,52 1,07  0,88 0,002160 0,001492 
NETHERLANDS  0,56  36 1,53 0,9762  1,38 1,17  0,76 0,001527 0,001043 
PORTUGAL  2,32 46,7 1,41 0,9299 1,71  1,07 1,11  0,005173 0,003709 
SPAIN  3,15 42,6 1,18 0,9127  1,65  1,16  1 0,006827 0,004982 
SWEDEN  1,63 43,5 1,73 0,9352 1,8  1,46  1,26  0,003447 0,002457 
UK  0,59 41,1 1,71 0,9755 1,43  1,43 1,18  0,000217 0,000148 
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